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Abstract. The quality of image generation and manipulation is reaching
impressive levels, making it increasingly difficult for a human to distin-
guish between what is real and what is fake. However, deep networks can
still pick up on the subtle artifacts in these doctored images. We seek to
understand what properties of fake images make them detectable and
identify what generalizes across different model architectures, datasets,
and variations in training. We use a patch-based classifier with limited
receptive fields to visualize which regions of fake images are more easily
detectable. We further show a technique to exaggerate these detectable
properties and demonstrate that, even when the image generator is ad-
versarially finetuned against a fake image classifier, it is still imperfect
and leaves detectable artifacts in certain image patches. Code is available
at https://chail.github.io/patch-forensics/.
Keywords: Image forensics, generative models, image manipulation,
visualization, generalization
1 Introduction
State-of-the-art image synthesis algorithms are constantly evolving, creating a
challenge for fake image detection methods to match the pace of content creation.
It is straightforward to train a deep network to classify real and fake images, but
of particular interest is the ability of fake image detectors to generalize to unseen
fake images. What artifacts do these fake image detectors look at, and which
properties can allow a detector released today to work on novel fake images?
Generalization is highly desired in machine learning, with the hope that
models work not only on training data, but also on related held-out examples as
well. For tasks like object detection and classification, this has been accomplished
with successively deeper and deeper networks that incorporate the context of the
entire image to learn about global semantics and object characteristics. On the
other hand, to learn image manipulation artifacts that are shared across various
image generation pipelines, global content is not the only signal that matters. In
fact, two identical generators trained on the same training data, differing only in
the random initialization seed, can create differences in content detectable by a
deep network classifier [35]. Instead of these differences, we seek to identify what
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image generators have in common, so that training on examples generated from
one model can help us identify fake images from another model.
Across different facial image generators, we hypothesize that global errors can
differ but local errors may transfer: the global facial structure can vary among
different generators and datasets, but local patches of a generated face are more
stereotyped and may share redundant artifacts. Therefore, these local errors
can be captured by a classifier focusing on textures [9] in small patches. We
investigate a fully convolutional approach to training classifiers, allowing us to
limit the receptive field of the model to focus on image patches. Furthermore,
these patch-based predictions offer us a natural way to visualize patterns that
are indicative of a real or fake image.
Using a suite of synthetic face datasets that span fully generative mod-
els [16,17,19,31] and facial manipulation methods [32], we find that more complex
patches, such as hair, are detectable across various synthetic image sources when
training on images from a single source. In one of our early experiments, however,
we observed that we could obtain misleadingly high generalization simply due
to subtle differences in image preprocessing – therefore, we introduce careful
preprocessing to avoid simply learning differences in image formatting.
With a fixed classifier, an attacker can simply modify the generator to
create adversarial examples of fake images, forcing them to become misclassified.
Accordingly, we finetune a GAN to create these adversarial examples. We then
show that a newly trained classifier can still detect images from this modified
GAN, and we investigate properties of these detected patches. Our results here
suggest that creating a coherent fake image without any traces of local artifacts is
difficult: the modified generator is still unable to faithfully model certain regions
of a fake image in a way that is indistinguishable from real ones.
Detecting fake images is a constant adversarial game with a number of
ethical considerations. As of today, no method is completely bulletproof. Better
generators, out-of-distribution images, or adversarial attacks [11,5] can defeat
a fake-image detector, and our approach remains vulnerable to many of these
same shortcomings. Furthermore, we train on widely used standard face datasets,
but these are still images of real individuals. To protect the privacy of people in
the dataset, we blur all real faces and manipulated real faces used in our figures.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
– To avoid learning image formatting artifacts, we preprocess our images to
reduce formatting differences between real and fake images.
– We use a fully-convolutional patch-based classifier to focus on local patches
rather than global structure, and test on different model resolutions, initial-
ization seeds, network architectures, and image datasets. On facial images,
we find that patch-based classifiers often perform better on out-of-domain
synthetic images than full-image classifiers.
– We categorize the patches that are most indicative of real or fake images
across various test datasets.
– To visualize detectable properties of fake images, we manipulate the generated
images to exaggerate characteristic attributes of fake images.
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– Finetuned generators are able to overcome a fake-image detector, but a
subsequent classifier shows that detectable mistakes still occur in certain
image patches.
2 Related Work
Image manipulation. Verifying image authenticity is not just a modern prob-
lem – historical instances of photo manipulation include a well-known portrait of
Abraham Lincoln3 and instances of image censorship in the former Soviet Union4.
However, recent developments in graphics and deep learning make creating forged
images easier than ever. One of these manipulation techniques is image splicing,
which combines multiple images to form a composite [12]. This approach is
directly relevant to face swapping, where a source face is swapped and blended
onto a target background to make a person appear in a falsified setting. The
deep learning analogue of face swapping, Deepfakes [1], has been the focus of
much recent media attention. In parallel, improvements in generative adversarial
networks (GANs) form another threat, as they are now able to create shockingly
realistic images of faces simply from random Gaussian noise [16,17].
Automating detection of manipulated images. Given the ease in creating
manipulated images nowadays and the potential to use them for malicious
purposes, a number of efforts have focused on automating detection of manipulated
images. A possible solution involves checking for consistency throughout the image
– examples include predicting metadata [14] or other low-level artifacts [27,28,29],
learning similar embeddings for nearby patches [38], or learning similarity graphs
from image patches [25]. Other works have focused on training classifiers for the
detection task, using a deep network either directly on RGB images [4,2,32] or
alternative image representations [7,26]. [30] uses a combination of both: a CNN
to extract features over image patches and a separate classifier for prediction.
Here we also take a patch-wise approach, and we use these patches to visualize
the network decisions.
Can detectors generalize? The class of potential manipulations is so large that
it is infeasible to cover all possible cases. Can a detector learn to distinguish real
and fake images from one source and transfer that knowledge to a different source?
Preprocessing is one way to encourage generalization, such as using spectral
features [37] or adding blur and random noise [34]. [33] generalizes across a wide
variety of datasets simply by adding various levels of augmentation. Specialized
architectures also help generalization: for example [8] uses an autoencoder with
a bottleneck that encourages different embeddings for real and fake images. A
challenge with generalization is that the classifiers are not explicitly trained
on the domain they are tested on. [22] demonstrates that it is possible to
3 https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170629-the-hidden-signs-that-can-
reveal-if-a-photo-is-fake
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship_of_images_in_the_Soviet_Union
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Fig. 1. We use a classifier with small receptive fields to obtain a heatmap over the
patch-wise output. To obtain this patch classifier, we truncate various deep learning
models after an initial sequence of layers.
simulate the domain of manipulated images; by applying warping to source
images, they can detect deepfake images without using manipulated images
in classifier training. [21] further studies generalization across different facial
manipulation techniques also using a simulated domain of blended real images.
However, a remaining question is what features do these models rely on to transfer
knowledge among different domains, which we seek to investigate here.
Classification with local receptive fields. We use patch-based classification
to visualize properties that generalize. Small receptive fields encourage the
classifier to focus on local artifacts rather than global semantics, which is also an
approach taken in GAN discriminators to encourage synthesis of realistic detailed
textures [15]. A related concept is the Markovian generative adversarial network
for texture synthesis [20]; the limited receptive field makes the assumption that
only pixels within a certain radius affect the output, and the pixels outside that
radius are independent from the output. [24] demonstrate a method for converting
deep neural classifiers to fully convolutional networks and use patch-wise training,
allowing the model to scale efficiently to arbitrarily-sized inputs, used for the
task of semantic segmentation.
3 Using Patches for Image Forensics
Rather than training a network to predict a global “real” or “fake” decisions for
an image, we use shallow networks with limited receptive fields that focus on
small patches of the image. This approach allows us to localize regions of the
image that are detected to be manipulated and ensemble the patch-wise decisions
to obtain the overall prediction.
3.1 Models for patch-based classification.
Modern deep learning architectures typically consist of a series of modular blocks.
By truncating the models after an intermediate block, we can obtain model
predictions based on a local region of the image, where truncating earlier in
the layer sequence results in a smaller receptive field, while truncating after
more layers results in a larger receptive field. We then add a 1x1 convolution
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layer after this truncated backbone to convert the feature representation into a
binary real-or-fake prediction. We experiment with Resnet and Xception as our
model backbones – generally we observe that Xception blocks perform better
than Resnet blocks, however we also report results of the top performing Resnet
block. We provide additional details on the model architecture and receptive field
calculations in Supplementary Material Sec. 6.3.
The truncation operation reduces the size of the model’s receptive field, and
yields a prediction for a receptive-field-sized patch of the input, rather than
the entire image at once. This forces the models to learn local properties that
distinguish between real and fake images, where the same model weights are
applied in a sliding fashion over the entire image, and each output prediction is
only a function of a small localized patch of the image. We apply a cross entropy
loss to each patch; i.e. every real patch should be considered real, and every fake
image patch should be considered fake:
L(x) = 1|P |
∑
i,j
∑
t
t log f t(xi,j) (1)
where f is the model output after a softmax operation to normalize the logits,
t indexes over the real and fake output for binary classification, (i, j) indexes
over the receptive field patches, and |P | is the total number of patches per
image. We train these models with the Adam optimizer with default learning
rate, and terminate training when validation accuracy does not improve for a
predetermined number of epochs.
By learning to classify patches, we increase the ratio of data points to model
parameters: each patch of the image is treated independently, and the truncated
models are smaller. The final classification output is an ensemble of the individual
patch decisions rather than a single output probability. To aggregate patches at
inference time, we take a simple average after applying a softmax operation to
the patch-wise predictions:
t∗ = arg max
t
 1
|P |
∑
i,j
f t(xi,j)
 (2)
The averaging approach can be applied in both cases where the image is wholly
generated, or when only part of the image is manipulated. For example, when a
generated face is spliced onto a real background, the background patches may
not be predicted as fake; in this case, because the same background is present in
both real and fake examples, the model remains uncertain in these locations.
3.2 Dataset preparation
Image preprocessing. A challenge with fully generative images, such as those
created by GANs, is that fake images can be saved with arbitrary codecs, e.g.,
we decide whether we want to save the image in JPG or PNG format. However,
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Fig. 2. To minimize the effect of image preprocessing artifacts - in which real and fake
images undergo different preprocessing operations – we pass real images through the
same data transform as used to train the generator. We then save the real and fake
images using identical pipelines.
the set of real images is saved with a fixed codec when the original dataset is
created. When training a classifier on real and fake images with subtly different
preprocessing pipelines, the classifier can simply learn to detect the differences in
preprocessing. If the test images also have this inconsistency, we would appear
to obtain high accuracy on the test set, even though the classifier is really only
detecting formatting artifacts. One way to mitigate this disparity is to apply
data augmentation to reduce the effect of these differences [33,34].
We preprocess the images to make our real and fake dataset as similar as
possible, in an effort to isolate fake image artifacts and minimize the possibility
of learning differences in preprocessing. We create the “real” dataset by passing
the real images through the generator’s data loading pipeline (e.g. resizing) and
saving the real images after this step in lossless PNG format (Fig. 2). We save
the fake images in PNG format from the generator output, so the remaining
differences between real and fake images are due to artifacts of the generator. We
then resize all images to the same size using Lanczos interpolation before saving
to file. Additional details are provided in Supplementary Material Sec. 7.1.
We take these precautions because any minor difference in preprocessing is
easily learnt by the fake-image classifier and leads to an illusion of increased
generalization capacity (for example, differences in the image codec leads to
perfect average precision across various test datasets; see Supplementary Material
Sec. 7.1). This approach allows us to focus on the inherent differences between
real images and generated ones to minimize any potential confounders due
to preprocessing. In the remainder of this section, we briefly detail the image
generation and manipulation methods that we investigate in our experiments.
Fully Generative Models. The first class of models we consider are fully
generative models which map a random sample from a known distribution (e.g.
a multivariate Gaussian) to an image. Progressive GAN (PGAN) [16] is one
recent example, which uses a progressive training schedule to increase the output
resolution of images during training. We use the publicly available PGAN model
trained on the CelebA-HQ face dataset. We also train several other PGANs
to various smaller resolutions and on the more diverse FFHQ face dataset.
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StyleGAN (SGAN) [17] introduces an alternative generator architecture which
incorporates the latent code into intermediate layers of the generator, resulting in
unsupervised disentanglement of high-level attributes, e.g., hair and skin tone. We
use the public versions of StyleGAN on the CelebA-HQ and FFHQ datasets, and
StyleGAN2 [18] on the FFHQ dataset. In additional to PGAN and SGAN, we also
consider the Glow generator [19], a flow-based model using modified 1x1 invertible
convolutions that optimizes directly for log-likelihood rather than adversarial
loss. We use the public Glow generator trained on CelebA-HQ faces. Finally, we
also include a face generator based on a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) rather
than convolutional layers [31]; the GMM uses low-rank plus diagonal Gaussians
to efficiently model covariance in high-dimensional outputs such as images. We
train the GMM model on the CelebA [23] dataset using default parameters.
Facial Manipulation Models. We use the FaceForensics++ dataset [32], which
includes methods for identity manipulation and expression transfer. Identity
manipulation approaches, such as FaceSwap, paste a source face onto a target
background; specifically, FaceSwap fits detected facial landmarks to 3D model
and then projects the face onto the target scene. The deep learning analogue to
FaceSwap is the Deepfake technique, which uses a pair of autoencoders with a
shared encoder to swap the source and target faces. On the other hand, expression
transfer maps the expression of a source actor onto the face of a target. Face2Face
achieves this by tracking expression parameters of the face in a source video and
applying them to a target sequence. Neural Textures uses deep networks to learn
a texture map and a neural renderer to modify the expression of the target face.
3.3 Baseline Models.
We train and evaluate full MesoInception4 [2], Resnet [13], and Xception [6]
models on the same datasets that we use to train the truncated classifiers.
Following [2], we train MesoInception4 using squared error loss. For the Resnet
model and the Xception model, also used in [32], we train with standard two-class
cross entropy loss. We train these models from scratch as they are not initially
trained for this classification task. Finally, we also compare to a model trained
to detect CNN artifacts via blurring and compression augmentations [33]. For
this model, we finetune at a learning rate of 1e-6 using similar augmentation
parameters as the original paper to improve its performance specifically on face
datasets. We use the same stopping criteria based on validation accuracy for all
baseline models as we use for the truncated models.
4 Experiments
4.1 Classification via patches.
Nowadays with access to public source code, it becomes easy for anyone to
train their own image generators with slight modifications. We conduct two
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Table 1. Average precision across PGANs trained to different resolutions or with
different random initialization seeds. The classifier is trained on a fake images from a
128px GAN and real images at 128px resolution. AP on the test set corresponding to
training images is colored in gray.
Resolution Model Seed
Model Depth 128 256 512 1024 0 1 2 3
Resnet Layer 1 100.0 99.99 99.60 96.95 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Xception Block 1 100.0 100.0 99.87 98.53 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Xception Block 2 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.98 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Xception Block 3 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.92 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Xception Block 4 100.0 100.0 99.92 99.34 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Xception Block 5 100.0 100.0 98.90 91.18 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
[2] MesoInception4 100.0 99.59 98.15 87.00 100.0 99.99 99.82 99.95
[13] Resnet-18 99.99 96.85 91.75 80.17 99.99 98.41 95.20 95.02
[6] Xception 100.0 99.94 99.84 97.28 100.0 100.0 99.99 100.0
[33] CNN (p=0.1) 100.0 99.99 99.97 99.78 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
[33] CNN (p=0.5) 100.0 100.0 99.99 99.83 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
experiments to test generalization across simple changes in (1) generator size
and (2) the weight initialization seed. In addition to the public 1024px PGAN,
we train PGANs for 512, 256, and 128px resolutions on the CelebA-HQ dataset
and sample images from each generator. We then train a classifier using only
images from the 128px generator.
We test the classifier on generated images from the remaining resolutions,
using average precision (AP) as a metric (Table 1; left). Here, the full-model
baselines tend to perform worse on the unseen test resolutions compared to the
truncated models. However, adding blur and JPEG augmentations in [33] helps
to overcome the full-model limitations, likely hiding the resizing artifacts. Of the
truncated models, the AP tends to decrease on the unseen test images as the
receptive field increases, although there is a slight decline when the receptive field
is too small with the Xception Block 1 model. On average across all resolutions,
the Xception Block 2 model obtains highest AP.
Next, we train four PGANs to 128px resolution with different weight initial-
ization seeds. We train the classifier using fake images drawn from one of the
generators, and test on the remaining generators (Table 1; right). Surprisingly,
even when the only difference between generators is the random seed, the full
Resnet-18 model makes errors when classifying fake images generated by the
three other GANs. This suggests that fake images generated by different PGANs
differ slightly between the different initialization seeds (as also noted in [35]).
The MesoInception4 and Xception architectures are more robust to model seed,
and so is blur/JPG augmentation. The truncated models with reduced receptive
field are also robust to model seed differences.
We then test the ability of patch classifiers to generalize to different generator
architectures (Table 2; left). To create a training set of PGAN fake images, we
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Table 2. Average precision on different model architectures and an alternative dataset
(FFHQ). The classifier is trained on 1024px PGAN random samples and reprojected
PGAN images on the CelebA-HQ dataset. For the Glow model (*) we observe better
performance when classifier training does not include reprojected images for the trun-
cated models; additional results in Supplementary Material Sec. 2.4. AP on the test set
corresponding to training images is colored in gray.
Architectures FFHQ dataset
Model PGAN SGAN Glow* GMM PGAN SGAN SGAN2
Resnet Layer 1 100.0 97.22 72.80 80.69 99.81 72.91 71.81
Xception Block 1 100.0 98.68 95.48 76.21 99.68 81.35 77.40
Xception Block 2 100.0 99.99 67.49 91.38 100.0 90.12 90.85
Xception Block 3 100.0 100.0 74.98 80.96 100.0 92.91 91.45
Xception Block 4 100.0 99.99 66.79 42.82 100.0 95.85 90.62
Xception Block 5 100.0 100.0 60.44 48.92 100.0 93.09 89.08
[2] MesoInception4 100.0 97.90 49.72 45.98 98.71 80.57 71.27
[13] Resnet-18 100.0 64.80 47.06 54.69 79.20 51.15 52.37
[6] Xception 100.0 99.75 55.85 40.98 99.94 85.69 74.33
[33] CNN (p=0.1) 100.0 98.41 90.46 50.65 99.95 90.48 85.27
[33] CNN (p=0.5) 100.0 97.34 97.32 73.33 99.93 88.98 84.58
combine two datasets – random samples from the generator, as well as images
obtained by reprojecting the real images into the GAN following [3]. Intuitively,
this reprojection step creates fake images generated by the GAN that are as close
as possible to their corresponding real images, forcing the classifier to focus on the
remaining differences (also see Supplementary Material Sec. 6.2, 7.4). We then
test the classifier on SGAN, Glow, and GMM face generators. We show additional
results training on only PGAN fake samples, as well as only on reprojected images
as the fake dataset in Supplementary Material Sec. 7.4 (on the Glow model, AP is
substantially better when trained without the reprojected images). Generalizing
to the SGAN architecture is easiest, due to the many similarities between the
PGAN and SGAN generators. With the exception of the Glow generator, the
truncated models obtain higher AP compared to the larger classifiers with a
fraction of the number of parameters.
Lastly, we test the classifiers’ ability to generalize to a different face dataset
(Table 2; right). Using the same classifiers trained on CelebA-HQ faces and PGAN
samples and reprojections, we measure AP on real images from the FFHQ dataset
and fake images from PGAN, SGAN, and SGAN2 trained on FFHQ faces. The
truncated classifiers improve AP, particularly on the Style-based generators. The
FFHQ dataset has greater diversity in faces than CelebA-HQ; however, small
patches, such as hair, are likely similar between the two datasets. Using small
receptive fields allows models to ignore global differences between images from
different generators and datasets and focus on shared generator artifacts, perhaps
explaining why truncated classifiers perform better than full models.
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Fig. 3. Heatmaps based on the patch-wise predictions on real and fake examples from
each dataset and fake image generator. We normalize all heatmaps between 0 and 1
and show fake values in blue and real values in red. We also show the average heatmap
over the 100 easiest and fake examples, where red is most indicative of the correct class.
4.2 What properties of fake images generalize?
What artifacts do classifiers learn that allow them to detect fake images generated
from different models? Since the patch-based classifiers output real-or-fake predic-
tions over sliding patches of a query image, we use these patch-wise predictions
to draw heatmaps over the images and visualize what parts of an image are
predicted as more real or more fake (Fig. 3). Using the classifiers trained on
CelebA-HQ PGAN images, we show examples of the prediction heatmaps for the
other face generators and on the FFHQ dataset, using the best performing patch
model for each column in Table 2. We also show an averaged heatmap over the
100 most real and most fake images, where the red areas indicate regions most
indicative of the correct class (Fig. 3; right). The average heatmaps highlight
predominately hair and background areas, indicating that these are the regions
that patch-wise models rely on when classifying images from unseen test sources.
Next, we take a pretrained facial segmentation network to partition each
image into semantic classes. For the most predictive patch in each image, we
assign the patch to a cluster from the segmentation map, and plot the distribution
of these semantic clusters (Fig. 4). We also sample a random patch in each image
and assign it to a semantic cluster for comparison. Using the segmentation model,
the predominant category of patches tends to be hair or background, with clothes,
skin, or brows comprising the third-largest category. Qualitatively, many of the
fake patches contain boundary edges such as those between hair and background
or hair and skin, suggesting that creating a realistic boundary is difficult for
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Fig. 4. We take a pretrained segmentation network to assign the most predictive patch
in real and fake images to a semantic cluster. We find that the fake-image classifier
(which was only trained on the CelebA-HQ dataset with PGAN fake images) relies on
patches such as hair, background, clothing, and mouths to make decisions.
image generators to imitate, whereas crisp boundaries naturally exist in real
images.
To further understand what makes fake images look fake, we modify the latent
space of the PGAN generator to exaggerate the features that the classifier detects
(Fig. 5). We parametrize a shift in latent space by a vector w, and optimize:
w∗ = arg min
w
Ez [Lfake(G(z − w)) + Lp(G(z), G(z − w))] (3)
where Lfake refers to the classifier loss on fake images [10], and Lp is a perceptual
loss regularizer [36] to ensure that the modified image does not deviate too far
from the original. Applying this vector to latent space samples accentuates hair
and smiling with teeth, which are both complex textures and likely difficult for
generators to recreate perfectly (Fig. 5). By applying the shift in the opposite
direction, G(z + w), we see a reduction these textures, in effect minimizing the
presence of textures that are more challenging for the generator to imitate.
4.3 Finetuning the generator.
With access to gradients from the classifier, an easy adversarial attack is to
modify the generator to evade detection by the classifier. Will this now make the
previously identified fake patches undetectable? To investigate this, we finetune
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Fig. 5. We shift the latent space of the PGAN generator to exaggerate the fake features
of an image, which exaggerates the hair and smile of the fake images.
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Fig. 6. We finetune the PGAN generator to evade detection by the fakeness classifier.
When we subsequently train a new classifier, we find that the finetuned generator still
has detectable artifacts, but now predominantely less in background patches.
a PGAN to create adversarial fake samples that are classified as real. To ensure
that the images remain realistic, we jointly optimize the classifier loss and GAN
loss on the CelebA-HQ dataset:
L = min
G
max
D
[LGAN(G,D) + Lreal(G,C)] ; (4)
i.e., we optimize both the generator and discriminator with the added constraint
that the generator output should be predicted as real by the classifier C. Fine-
tuning the generator does not drastically change the generated output (see
Supplementary Material Sec. 7.7), but it decreases the classifier’s accuracy from
100% to below 65% (Fig. 6). Using a variable threshold (AP) is less sensitive
to this adversarial finetuning. We train a second classifier using images from
the finetuned generator, which is able to recover in accuracy. We then compute
the most predictive image patches for the retrained classifier and cluster them
according to semantic category. Compared to the patches captured by the first
classifier, this retrained classifier relies less on background patches and more on
facial features, suggesting that artifacts in typically solid background patches are
easiest for the generator to hide, while artifacts in more textured regions such as
hair still remain detectable.
4.4 Facial manipulation.
Unlike the fully-generative scenario, facial manipulation methods blend content
from two images, hence only a portion of the image is manipulated. Here, we train
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Table 3. Average precision on FaceForensics++ [32] datasets. Each model is trained
on one dataset and evaluated on the remaining datasets.
Train on Deepfakes Train on Neural Tex.
Model Depth DF NT F2F FS DF NT F2F FS
Resnet Layer 1 98.97 74.99 71.74 57.15 70.32 86.93 65.04 52.37
Xception Block 1 92.95 70.52 65.94 52.83 66.30 80.72 62.65 52.05
Xception Block 2 98.04 70.28 67.48 56.04 69.61 85.75 64.27 52.70
Xception Block 3 99.41 67.58 63.62 57.97 67.62 85.44 60.71 52.07
Xception Block 4 99.14 68.91 70.36 58.74 73.65 90.97 60.72 52.79
Xception Block 5 99.27 68.25 66.68 43.20 83.52 92.23 63.75 49.94
[2] MesoInception4 97.28 59.27 60.17 47.24 65.75 83.27 62.92 54.03
[13] Resnet-18 93.90 53.22 53.45 53.69 69.98 85.40 54.77 50.89
[32] Xception 98.60 60.15 56.84 46.12 70.07 93.61 56.79 48.55
[33] CNN (p=0.1) 97.78 60.08 59.73 50.87 68.67 95.16 68.15 47.43
[33] CNN (p=0.5) 98.16 54.02 56.06 55.99 66.98 95.03 71.50 51.93
Train on Face2Face Train on FaceSwap
Model Depth DF NT F2F FS DF NT F2F FS
Resnet Layer 1 84.39 79.72 97.66 60.53 59.49 52.56 62.00 97.13
Xception Block 1 77.65 80.88 93.84 61.62 53.14 49.24 56.89 82.89
Xception Block 2 84.04 79.51 97.40 63.21 58.39 51.65 61.73 92.58
Xception Block 3 76.10 74.77 97.33 63.10 61.77 53.44 61.34 96.06
Xception Block 4 67.18 61.72 97.19 63.04 61.33 52.02 59.45 96.56
Xception Block 5 81.25 61.91 96.45 55.15 57.14 47.39 54.68 95.57
[2] MesoInception4 67.53 55.17 92.27 54.06 50.64 48.87 56.15 93.81
[13] Resnet-18 55.43 52.57 93.27 53.39 61.03 51.66 52.56 91.49
[6] Xception 66.12 56.07 97.41 53.15 53.86 50.00 56.55 96.84
[33] CNN (p=0.1) 65.76 64.81 98.40 59.48 59.19 53.50 63.07 99.02
[33] CNN (p=0.5) 65.43 60.36 97.94 63.52 60.19 52.11 59.81 98.25
on each of the four FaceForensics++ datasets [32], and test generalization to the
remaining three datasets (Table 3). We compare the effect of different receptive
fields using truncated models, and investigate which patches are localized.
In these experiments, training on Face2Face images yields the best generaliza-
tion to remaining datasets. On the other hand, generalization to FaceSwap images
is the hardest – training on the other manipulation methods does not generalize
well to FaceSwap images, and training on FaceSwap does not generalize well to
other manipulation methods. Compared to the full-model baselines, we find that
truncated patch classifiers tend to generalize when trained on the Face2Face or
Deepfakes domains. Adding augmentations to training [33] can also boost results
in some domains. While we do not use mask supervision during training, [21]
notes that using this additional supervision signal improves generalization.
Next, we seek to investigate which patches are identified as predictive using
the truncated classifiers in the facial manipulation setting. Unlike the fully
generative scenario in which the classifiers tend to focus on the background,
these classifiers trained on facial manipulation focus on the face region (without
explicit supervision of the face location). In particular, when trained on the
Face2Face manipulation method, the classifiers use predominately the mouth
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region to classify Deepfakes and NeuralTextures manipulation, with eyes or nose
as a secondary feature depending on the manipulation method (Fig. 7). We show
additional visualizations in Supplementary Material Sec. 7.6.
Neural Textures
mouth nose skin
re
al
fa
ke
Deepfakes
mouth eye brows
re
al
fa
ke
Face2Face
mouth nose eye
re
al
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ke
Fig. 7. Histograms of the most predictive patches from a classifier trained on Face2Face
and un-manipulated images, and tested on the Neural Textures and Deepfakes ma-
nipulation methods. Unlike the fully-generative model setup, the classifier in this case
localizes patches within the face.
5 Conclusion
Identifying differences between real and fake images is a constantly evolving
problem and is highly sensitive to minor preprocessing details. Here, we take the
approach of equalizing the preprocessing of the two classes of images to focus on
the inherent differences between an image captured from a camera and a doctored
image either generated entirely from a deep network, or partially manipulated in
facial regions. We investigate using classifiers with limited receptive fields to focus
on local artifacts, such as textures in hair, backgrounds, mouths, and eyes, rather
than the global semantics of the image. Classifying these small patches allows us
to generalize across different model training parameters, generator architectures,
and datasets, and provides us with a heatmap to localize the potential areas
of manipulation. We show a technique to exaggerate the detectable artifacts of
the fake images, and demonstrate that image generators can still be imperfect
in certain patches despite finetuning against a given classifier. While progress
on detecting fake images inevitably creates a cat-and-mouse problem of using
these results to create even better generators, we hope that understanding these
detectors and visualizing what they look for can help people anticipate where
manipulations may occur in a facial image and better navigate potentially falsified
content in today’s media.
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Supplementary Materials
In the Supplementary Materials we include additional details on our dataset
extraction process for both real and fake images (Sec. 6.1–6.2) and details on
training the classifiers and visualization (Sec. 6.3–6.5). We also include a number
of additional experiments and visualizations. Namely, classifiers for generated
images are extremely sensitive to subtle differences in preprocessing, and minor
differences will allow the classifier to easily learn preprocessing artifacts rather
than forensic signals, which gives the appearance of high generalization capability
– we include results that demonstrate this effect in Sec. 7.1. We also investigate
additional training configurations and visualizations in Sec. 7.2–7.7.
6 Supplementary Methods
6.1 Dataset Construction
Real Images
CelebA-HQ: We prepare the CelebA-HQ images following the dataset preparation
pipeline in the PGAN repository.5. This saves the images in various resolutions
from 4x4px to 1024x1024px in a tfrecord format, which are then subsequently
used to train the PGAN generators. For our real CelebA-HQ dataset, we extract
the images from the tfrecord format, similar to during PGAN training, at the
same resolution of the generator – i.e., if the fake images are generated from a
128px PGAN, then the real images used for comparison are extracted from the
128px tfrecord. This is to avoid any resizing operations that are different from
the subsampling used during GAN training. We partition the images into training
and validation images following the CelebA partitions, which yields 24183 images
for training and 2993 for validation, and 2824 for testing. All images are resized
to 128x128 resolution using Lanczos interpolation and saved in PNG format.
FFHQ: We download the prepared images in tfrecord format directly from the
FFHQ repository6 and extract them at 1024 resolution for comparison with 1024
resolution generator models. Following the suggested partition in the repository,
we reserve the first 60000 images as the training set, the next 5000 for validation
and the final 5000 for testing. All images are resized to 128x128 resolution using
Lanczos interpolation and saved in PNG format.
5 https://github.com/tkarras/progressive_growing_of_gans
6 https://github.com/NVlabs/ffhq-dataset
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CelebA: We follow the data transformation pipeline used to train the CelebA
GMM model.7, which includes a crop operation to localize the face and bilinear
resize to 64 pixel resolution for comparison to the fake images generated by the
GMM. We use the testing split of 19962 images for classifier evaluation. All
images are resized to 128x128 resolution using Lanczos interpolation and saved
in PNG format. The CelebA dataset is a superset of the faces in CelebA-HQ,
although at a lower resolution and with a slightly different facial crop.
Generated Images
PGAN: We download the pretrained 1024px resolution CelebA-HQ generator
from the PGAN repository.5 Separately, we train PGANs on the CelebA-HQ
dataset to 128px, 256px, and 512px final resolutions. We change the random
initialization seed and train 3 additional PGANs to 128px resolution. We also
train a PGAN to 1024px resolution on the FFHQ dataset. All images are sampled
from the generator, resized to 128x128 resolution using Lanczos interpolation,
and saved in PNG format. We sample the same number of images as used in
each split of the corresponding real dataset.
SGAN/SGAN2: We download the pretrained 1024px resolution generators trained
on the CelebA-HQ and FFHQ datasets from the StyleGAN repository,8 and the
the pretrained 1024px resolution generator trained on the FFHQ dataset from
the StyleGAN2 repository.9 Images are sampled from the generator, resized to
128x128 resolution using Lanczos interpolation, and saved in PNG format. We
sample the same number of images as used in each split of the corresponding real
dataset.
GMM: We train the Mixture of Factor Analyzers Gaussian Mixture model based
on [31] using the default training settings provided in the source code.7 Images
are sampled from the generator, resized to 128x128 resolution using Lanczos
interpolation, and saved in PNG format. We sample the same number of images
as used in each split of the corresponding real dataset.
Glow: We sample images from the 1024px resolution pretrained model in the
Glow repository.10 We perform random manipulation of attributes by selecting
an attribute tag and a manipulation amount within the range [−1, 1] uniformly
at random, and apply this to each sample. Images are then resized to 128x128
resolution using Lanczos interpolation and saved in PNG format. We sample the
same number of images as used in each split of the corresponding real dataset.
7 https://github.com/eitanrich/torch-mfa
8 https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan
9 https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan2
10 https://github.com/openai/glow
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FaceForensics
We download the Deepfakes, Face2Face, FaceSwap, NeuralTextures, and original
videos from the FaceForensics++ dataset [32]11 in compressed format. We use
the training and validation splits suggested by the authors. To localize the face,
we use the dlib face detector12 to extract eyes, nose, and mouth landmarks, and
based on these detected landmarks, align and crop the the frames using the
CelebA-HQ alignment approach (the CelebA images are annotated with these
landmarks a priori, which are then used to generate the CelebA-HQ images; here,
we automate that process). For training images, we extract all frames in the
corresponding training videos. For validation and testing images, we extract 100
frames per video to prevent any video from have more influence than the others.
6.2 Reprojecting Fake Images
Apart from generating fake samples by sampling from a generative model, we
can also create hard negative examples by generating fake GAN images that are
most similar to a given real target image – i.e., we project real images to the
output manifold of the generative model. To create these images, we use the
approach in [3], which uses a hybrid encoder and optimization approach. First,
given an image x, an encoder E is trained layer-wise such that G(E(x)) ≈ x. This
provides a latent code initialization z = E(x) for the second optimization step,
which uses an LBGFS optimizer over z to minimize |x − G(z)|. We add these
reprojected examples to the fake image dataset when training the classifier, but
also conduct experiments in which the classifier is trained 1) without reprojected
images and 2) only on reprojected images as fake samples in Sec. 7.4.
Table 4. Model receptive field and parameter count calculations.
Truncated Model RF # Params Full Model # Params
Resnet Layer 1 43 0.158 M [13] Resnet-18 11.178 M
Xception Block 1 19 0.055 M [2] MesoInception4 0.029 M
Xception Block 2 43 0.191 M [6] Xception 20.811 M
Xception Block 3 91 1.108 M [33] CNN (p=0.1) 23.510 M
Xception Block 4 187 2.722 M [33] CNN (p=0.5) 23.510 M
Xception Block 5 263 4.336 M
6.3 Patch Classifiers Architecture
Truncating a classifier reduces the receptive field and number of parameters of
the model. Effectively, it increases the ratio of data to model size, as the same
model weights are used across all patches of an input image. In Table 4, we
provide calculations on the receptive field size and number of parameters for
11 https://github.com/ondyari/FaceForensics/
12 https://github.com/davisking/dlib
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each model used in our experiments. We construct truncated classifiers using
Resnet [13] and Xception [6] models as backbones. The Resnet architecture
consists of four layers containing residual skip connections – in our experiments
we observe that truncating after the first residual layer often performs best.
The Xception architecture consists of 12 blocks with residual connections and
separable convolutions, we conduct experiments truncating after the first five
blocks.
6.4 Additional Training Details
We train all models using the Adam optimizer with default parameters and
learning rate (0.001). We use a batch size of 32 images, consisting of 16 real and
16 fake images. After every epoch, we measure raw patch-wise prediction accuracy
(without ensembling patch decisions) on validation images corresponding to the
training dataset. We stop training when validation accuracy does not improve
for a patience parameter of 5 ∗ p epochs - we use p = 50 for the Xception Block
1 patch classifier, p = 20 for the Xception Block 2 patch classifier, and p = 10
for the deeper models. We use the checkpoint with the highest raw validation
accuracy to evaluate on the test data split. For training, we resize all images
to native size for each model – 299 for Xception architectures, 224 for Resnet
architectures, and 256 for MesoNet architectures.
When training with reprojected images, we have paired examples of the
original image and the reprojected image. When creating batches, we sample
both the original and the reprojection within the batch. We use a similar approach
for the FaceForensics++ dataset, where we have paired examples of the original
and manipulated images. This creates hard negative samples, which we found
to improve classification performance. When training with the FaceForensics++
dataset, we do not use information about the manipulated region – rather, the
classifier’s objective is simply to predict all patches in the real image as real and
all patches in the fake image as fake. Because the background is unlearnable, the
classifier’s predictions in the background region for the FaceForensics++ datasets
remain uncertain. However, [21] notes that using the additional mask location as
learning supervision improves classification.
6.5 Facial Segmentation Model
To visualize the patch-wise model decisions, we use a facial segmentation network
and cluster patches by semantic category. Precisely, for each real or fake image,
we take the most predictive patch in the image and label it by semantic category.
For the segmentation task, we use a BiSeNet pretrained on the CelebAMask-HQ
dataset.13 The network output assigns each input pixel to one of 19 categories:
background, skin, left/right brow, left/right eye, eyeglasses, left/right ear, earring,
nose, mouth, upper/lower lip, neck, necklace, clothes, hair, and hat. We group
together the left/right brow classes into a brow category, left/right eye and
13 https://github.com/zllrunning/face-parsing.PyTorch
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eyeglasses into eyes, left/right ear and earring into ears, mouth and upper/lower
lip into mouth, and neck and necklace into neck, which yields 11 semantic
categories in total.
Given an image, we use the segmentation network to obtain a semantic class
prediction for each pixel. To assign the patch to a cluster, we tally the number
of pixels in the patch belonging to each segmentation class, and normalize by
the total number of pixels labelled as that class in the image. We assign the
patch to the cluster with the highest normalized proportion. This normalization
step helps to appropriately weight classes of small features – e.g. in a patch
containing eyebrows, the most common cluster assignment will be skin, but the
most common normalized cluster assignment will be eyebrows since the total
number of eyebrow pixels in the full image is lower.
7 Additional Experiments
7.1 Preprocessing
One critical step of the real vs. fake classification task is to make sure that the
classifier is not simply learning differences in the preprocessing of real or fake
images, especially since we do not know the exact preprocessing steps taken in
the real image datasets. The solution we use is to pass the real images through
the data transformation used to train the generator, so that we can construct
the real image dataset in a manner as similar as possible to the fake images
output from the generator. In our early experiments, we found that a few subtle
differences in this preprocessing pipeline will allow the model to learn differences
in preprocessing. If all real and fake datasets (training and testing) have this
discrepancy, then this will lead to artificially high generalization performance.
Table 5. Slight differences in the preprocessing for real or fake images leads to seemingly
increases generalization, as the classifier ends up exploiting these differences. We report
average precision for a classifier trained on PGAN fake images on the CelebA-HQ
dataset and tested on the remaining datasets. AP on the test set corresponding to
training images is colored in gray.
Architectures FFHQ dataset
Preprocessing PGAN SGAN GLOW GMM PGAN SGAN SGAN2
identical preprocessing 100.00 64.80 47.06 54.69 79.20 51.15 52.37
different interpolation 99.93 99.33 99.76 85.40 99.44 99.08 99.09
different initial size 100.00 100.00 100.00 97.81 100.00 100.00 100.00
different image format 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
The standard pipeline that we use in the main text for training the fake-image
classifier consists of the following steps for real images:
22 Chai et al.
1. We pass real images through generator data transform.
2. All images are resized to the same size (128px) before saving in PNG format.
3. When loading the image during training, we resize the image to the classifier’s
native resolution, perform mean centering, and then input to the classifier.
For the fake images, we replace step 1 with sampling and renormalizing the
output from the generator.
We experiment with 3 small variations on the preprocessing pipeline, and
apply these variations consistently across the CelebA-HQ, FFHQ, and CelebA
real-image datasets.
– interpolation: Before saving to file, real and fake images undergo different
interpolation methods (bilinear vs. lanczos).
– initial size: Real and fake images are saved to file in different resolutions.
– image format: Real and fake images are saved in different image codecs (JPG
vs PNG).
Average precision results using the full Resnet-18 model (generally the weaker
model in our generalization experiments) are shown in Table 5. When controlling
for image format, interpolation, and size differences, the performance of the
classifier decreases when tested on different datasets. However, training the same
model in which the real dataset is differently processed from the fake dataset
leads to the appearance of very high generalization, when in fact the classifier
is just learning the differences in preprocessing. These results show that subtle
artifacts in preprocessing are in fact easy to learn, and that these classifiers are
very sensitive to the types of preprocessing used during training and inference
time. Note that these preprocessing artifacts are still learnable even despite a
second resizing step which converts real and fake images to the same size with
the same interpolation method prior to being input to the classifier.
7.2 Additional Training Variations
Alignment vs Cropping. In our main experiments, we train with all patches
of aligned facial image and ensemble patch-wise predictions to obtain a binary
prediction. We also experimented with random cropping and random resized
cropping augmentations during training by resizing the image to 333px resolution,
and take a random crop (or random resized crop) of 299 pixels for Xception
network training. We compare the classification results on aligned faces, random
crops, and random resized crops in Tables 6, 7, and 8 respectively. The results
with added cropping are somewhat mixed – random cropping boosts Glow
generalization, although not as much as training without reprojected images (in
Table 12), and random resized cropping helps slightly in the GMM case, while
the FFHQ datasets fare better without cropping augmentation.
A possible explanation for this behavior is that faces are naturally structured
and can be aligned via facial landmarks – CelebA-HQ and FFHQ datasets are
already aligned, whereas we automatically align the FaceForensics dataset using
a facial landmark detector (see Table 9 for a comparison). Secondly, truncated
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Table 6. Average precision on test datasets when trained on CelebA-HQ PGAN images.
AP on the test set corresponding to training images is colored in gray.
Architectures FFHQ dataset
Model PGAN SGAN GLOW GMM PGAN SGAN SGAN2
Xception Block 1 100.00 98.68 82.39 76.21 99.68 81.35 77.40
Xception Block 2 100.00 99.99 46.35 91.38 100.00 90.12 90.85
Xception Block 3 100.00 100.00 64.77 80.96 100.00 92.91 91.45
Xception Block 4 100.00 99.99 51.80 42.82 100.00 95.85 90.62
Xception Block 5 100.00 100.00 58.18 48.92 100.00 93.09 89.08
Table 7. Average precision on test datasets when trained on CelebA-HQ PGAN images.
Random cropping is applied during training.
Architectures FFHQ dataset
Model PGAN SGAN GLOW GMM PGAN SGAN SGAN2
Xception Block 1 100.00 97.87 89.60 84.00 99.48 79.00 76.64
Xception Block 2 100.00 99.93 47.02 82.47 99.99 88.40 89.58
Xception Block 3 100.00 99.97 41.24 86.76 100.00 86.69 87.25
Xception Block 4 100.00 99.85 56.84 66.14 100.00 91.60 88.36
Xception Block 5 100.00 99.63 54.39 84.52 99.99 89.56 88.86
Table 8. Average precision on test datasets when trained on CelebA-HQ PGAN images.
Random resized cropping is applied during training.
Architectures FFHQ dataset
Model PGAN SGAN GLOW GMM PGAN SGAN SGAN2
Xception Block 1 100.00 93.22 63.99 74.13 98.81 76.83 71.04
Xception Block 2 100.00 99.78 46.35 56.80 99.98 85.93 85.71
Xception Block 3 100.00 99.91 50.46 56.34 99.99 90.10 90.11
Xception Block 4 100.00 99.80 36.94 80.88 100.00 88.69 86.80
Xception Block 5 100.00 99.79 64.22 92.75 99.99 89.99 89.22
models can tolerate minor shifts, as the same model weights are applied over
local patches in a sliding fashion over the image.
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Table 9. Average precision on test datasets when trained on Face2Face manipulated
images. Images are automatically aligned using facial landmarks. We compare average
precision on test images when trained on aligned patches (left four columns) and random
crops of patches (right four columns).
Face Alignment Random Cropping
Model DF NT F2F FS DF NT F2F FS
Xception Block 1 77.65 80.88 93.84 61.62 76.46 79.11 92.44 60.08
Xception Block 2 84.04 79.51 97.40 63.21 83.19 80.61 97.01 63.59
Xception Block 3 76.10 74.77 97.33 63.10 76.15 75.23 98.00 63.17
Xception Block 4 67.18 61.72 97.19 63.04 71.91 68.01 98.60 62.01
Xception Block 5 81.25 61.91 96.45 55.15 76.44 62.78 96.10 52.63
Table 10. Comparing the effect on model size and receptive field on test datasets.
The Extended block2 model adds two additional Xception blocks modified with 1x1
convolutions to increase parameter count without increasing receptive field. AP on the
test set corresponding to training images is colored in gray.
Architectures FFHQ dataset
Model PGAN SGAN GLOW GMM PGAN SGAN SGAN2
Xception Block 2 100.00 99.99 46.35 91.38 100.00 90.12 90.85
Extended Block 2 100.00 99.99 39.23 91.54 100.00 87.82 89.43
Xception Block 4 100.00 99.99 51.80 42.82 100.00 95.85 90.62
7.3 Receptive field vs. number of parameters
There are two main differences between a shallow truncated model and a deeper
one – receptive field and number of parameters. Hypothetically, both factors could
reduce overfitting and improve generalization. In Table 10 we seek disentangle
these two components when evaluating generalization on test datasets. We take
the Xception Block 2 and Xception Block 4 truncated models, and additionally
train an Extended Block 2 model by adding 2 additional Xception blocks to the
Block 2 model, modified with 1x1 convolutions. This increases the number of
parameters of the Block 2 truncated model without increasing the receptive field.
However, despite this increase in parameters, we do not see large increases in
average precision on the test datasets, suggesting that perhaps the receptive field
size contributes more to generalization on unseen faces at test time.
7.4 Training with reprojected image samples.
For detecting fake images created from generative models, we find that adding
reprojected fake images – i.e., the GAN-generated image most similar a given real
image, helps to improve performance on the test datasets in most cases. Here, we
compare those results (Table 11) to models trained only on random samples from
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the fake image generators (Table 12) and models trained only on reprojected
fake images (Table 13). One exception where adding the reprojected fake images
harms classification, compared to training only with random samples, in the case
of the Glow fake images where there is a difference in AP of over 10%. On the
other hand, when training only with reprojected images there is a domain shift
between train and test data, as the model is evaluated on random samples from
the generator which are never seen during training. Hence, the test AP is lower
in most cases, except for the GMM model where it is similar.
How does training with reprojected images affect the patches that the classifier
uses for classification? For this experiment, we take the same classifiers as before,
trained on CelebA-HQ PGAN images. In Fig. 8 we show patches grouped by
semantic category when the classifier is tested on various FFHQ generators.
Training with reprojected images causes the classifier place greater emphasis
on background patches, compared to training without reprojections, suggesting
that adding the reprojection better allows the classifier to learn artifacts in the
background portion of the image.
Train without reprojectionsTrain with reprojections
Test on 
 FFHQ PGAN
Test on 
FFHQ SGAN2
Fig. 8. Top patches categorized by segmentation category for classifiers trained with
and with reprojected fake images. Adding reprojections to the training set causes the
classifier to place greater emphasis on background patches.
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Table 11. Average precision on datasets when trained on CelebaHQ PGAN images
and reprojected images as the fake image dataset. AP on the test set corresponding to
training images is colored in gray.
Architectures FFHQ dataset
Model PGAN SGAN GLOW GMM PGAN SGAN SGAN2
Xception Block 1 100.00 98.68 82.39 76.21 99.68 81.35 77.40
Xception Block 2 100.00 99.99 46.35 91.38 100.00 90.12 90.85
Xception Block 3 100.00 100.00 64.77 80.96 100.00 92.91 91.45
Xception Block 4 100.00 99.99 51.80 42.82 100.00 95.85 90.62
Xception Block 5 100.00 100.00 58.18 48.92 100.00 93.09 89.08
Table 12. Average precision on datasets when trained on only CelebA-HQ PGAN
samples as the fake image dataset.
Architectures FFHQ dataset
Model PGAN SGAN GLOW GMM PGAN SGAN SGAN2
Xception Block 1 100.00 93.78 95.48 78.91 89.29 67.84 66.74
Xception Block 2 100.00 99.90 67.49 77.34 99.89 84.27 84.56
Xception Block 3 100.00 99.92 74.98 71.29 99.97 88.49 87.78
Xception Block 4 100.00 98.81 66.79 68.06 99.79 84.67 79.50
Xception Block 5 100.00 95.25 60.44 68.47 98.95 71.75 70.83
Table 13. Average precision on datasets when trained on only images reprojected via
PGAN as the fake image dataset.
Architectures FFHQ dataset
Model PGAN SGAN GLOW GMM PGAN SGAN SGAN2
Xception Block 1 97.74 90.57 31.30 77.49 99.60 70.92 71.90
Xception Block 2 99.98 99.34 39.91 92.03 99.97 84.00 84.27
Xception Block 3 99.86 99.23 45.53 89.89 99.95 79.90 78.57
Xception Block 4 99.02 97.13 48.06 43.24 99.21 66.00 66.60
Xception Block 5 87.30 79.86 48.94 50.47 96.25 53.31 56.65
7.5 Investigating biases in the classifiers
To investigate biases in the fake-image classifier, we take the pre-trained detector
on male and female faces from [17] and compute average precision conditioned
on the male or female classes predicted by the detector. Classifiers are on trained
on CelebA-HQ faces and PGAN samples. When there is no domain gap between
training and test time, the classifier can solve the task perfectly for both male
and female categories. Next we test on two datasets where a domain gap exists –
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Table 14. We take a pre-trained classifier on male and female faces and calculate AP
on the test images to investigate biases in the fake-image classifier.
Test Set AP Overall # Total AP male # Male AP female # Female
CelebAHQ PGAN 100.0 5986 100.0 2024 100.0 3962
CelebAHQ Glow 94.9 5986 96.6 2034 93.9 3952
FFHQ SGAN2 91.7 10000 93.3 4480 90.4 5520
CelebA-HQ faces generated using the Glow model and FFHQ faces generated
using the SGAN2 model. In these more difficult cases, the fake-image classifier
obtains slightly higher AP on faces categorized as male by the pre-trained
detector.
7.6 Additional FaceForensics Visualizations
In the main text we show patch-wise visualizations and statistics for training on
unmanipulated images and Face2Face images and testing on Neural Textures and
Deepfakes images. Here we show similar visualization when trained on Deepfakes
images in Fig. 9. In addition, we show examples of local classifier predictions and
heatmaps of the top 100 most predictive images in Fig 10. While the heatmap
of test images corresponding to the training set capture the general face area,
heatmaps of images corresponding to different manipulation methods highlight
more local features, such as lower face or eye regions.
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Fig. 9. Histograms of the most predictive patches from a classifier trained on Deep-
fakes and un-manipulated images, and tested on the Neural Textures and Face2Face
manipulation methods
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Fig. 10. Heatmaps showing examples of the patch-wise prediction output of a classifier
on one FaceForensics method and tested on other methods. We also show the average
heatmap over the 100 most predictive real and manipulated images for each dataset.
7.7 Example Images after Finetuning
In the main text, we finetune a face PGAN generator to evade classification by a
fakeness detector, which drops detection accuracy to from 100% to below 65%.
Fig. 11 shows random samples from the generator before and after finetuning.
The samples remain visually similar despite finetuning but are misclassified by
the detector. We further show in the main text that a secondary classifier trained
on these finetuned images can recover in classification accuracy, which suggests
that finetuning does not completely remove the detectable artifacts and the
finetuned images are still distinguishable from real faces.
Fig. 11. Samples from PGAN generator before (left) and after (right) finetuning to
evade a fakeness classifier.
